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Abstract
Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical
rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing
that any strategy is admissible or dominated by an admissible strategy. However, in games played
on finite graphs with quantitative objectives (as used for reactive synthesis), this is not the case.
We consider increasing chains of strategies instead to recover a satisfactory rationality no-
tion based on dominance in such games. We start with some order-theoretic considerations
establishing sufficient criteria for this to work. We then turn our attention to generalised safe-
ty/reachability games as a particular application. We propose the notion of maximal uniform
chain as the desired dominance-based rationality concept in these games. Decidability of some
fundamental questions about uniform chains is established.
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1 Introduction
The canonical model to formalize the reactive synthesis problem are two-player win/lose
perfect information games played on finite (directed) graphs [18, 1]. In recent years, more
general objectives and multiplayer games have been studied (see e.g. [14] or [6] and additional
references therein). When moving beyond two-player win/lose games, the traditional solution
concept of a winning strategy needs to be updated by another notion. The game-theoretic
literature offers a variety of concepts of rationality to be considered as candidates.
The notion we focus on here is admissibility: roughly speaking, judging strategies according
to this criterion allows to deem rational only strategies that are not worse than any other
strategy (ie, that are not dominated). In this sense, admissible strategies represent maximal
elements in the whole set of strategies available to a player. One attractive feature of
admissibility, or more generally, dominance based rationality notions is that they work on
the level of an individual agent. Unlike e.g. to justify Nash equilibria, no common rationality,
shared knowledge or any other assumptions on the other players are needed to explain why a
specific agent would avoid dominated strategies.
The study of admissibility in the context of games played on graphs was initiated by
Berwanger in [3] and subsequently became an active research topic (e.g. [10, 8, 2, 7, 9], see
related work below). In [3], Berwanger established in the context of perfect-information
games with boolean objectives that admissibility is the good criterion for rationality: every
strategy is either admissible or dominated by an admissible strategy.
Unfortunately, this fundamental property does not hold when one considers quantitative
objectives. Indeed, as soon as there are three different possible payoffs, one can find instances
of games where a strategy is neither dominated by an admissible strategy, nor admissible itself
(see Example 1). This third payoff actually allows for the existence of infinite domination
sequences of strategies, where each element of the sequence dominates its predecessor and
is dominated by its successor in the chain. Consequently, no strategy in such a chain is
admissible. However, it can be the case that no admissible strategy dominates the elements
of the chain. In the absence of a maximal element above these strategies, one may ask why
they should be discarded in the quest of a rational choice. They may indeed represent a type
of behaviour that is rational but not captured by the admissibility criterion.
Our contributions. To formalize this behaviour, we study increasing chains of strategies
(Definition 3). A chain is weakly dominated by some other chain, if every strategy in the
first is below some strategy in the second. The question then arises whether every chain
is below a maximal chain. Based on purely order-theoretic argument, a sufficient criterion
is given in Theorem 12. However, Corollary 18 shows that our sufficient criterion does not
apply to all games of interests. We can avoid the issue by restricting to some countable class
of strategies, e.g. just the regular, computable or hyperarithmetic ones (Corollary 20).
We test the abstract notion in the concrete setting of generalised safety/reachability
games (Definition 22). Based on the observation that the crucial behaviour captured by
chains of strategies, but not by single strategies is Repeat this action a large but finite number
of times, we introduce the notion of a parameterized automaton (Definition 32), which
essentially has just this ability over the standard finite automata. We then show that any
finite memory strategy is below a maximal chain or strategy realized by a parameterized
automaton (Theorem 35).
Finally, we consider some algorithmic properties of chains and parameterized automata
in generalised safety/reachability games. It is decidable in PTime whether a parameterized
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automaton realizes a chain of strategies (Theorem 42). It is also decidable in PTime whether
the chain realized by one parameterized automaton dominates the chain realized by another
(Theorem 43).
Related work. As mentioned above, the study of dominance and admissibility for games
played on graphs was initiated by Berwanger in [3]. Faella analyzed several criteria for how a
player should play a win/lose game on a finite graph that she cannot win, eventually settling
on the notion of admissible strategy [12].
Admissibility in quantitative perfect-information sequential games played on graphs
was studied in [8]. Concurrent games were considered in [2]. In [7], games with imperfect
information, but boolean objectives were explored. The study of decision problems related to
admissibility (as we do in Subsection 4.3) was advanced in [10]. The complexity of decision
problems related to dominance in normal form games has received attention, see [17] for an
overview. For the role of admissibility for synthesis, we refer to [9].
Our Subsection 3.1 involves an investigation of cofinal chains in certain quasi-ordered
sets. A similar theme (but with a different focus) is present in [20].
2 Background
2.1 Games on finite graphs
A turn-based multiplayer game G on a finite graph G is a tuple G = 〈P,G, (pi)i∈P 〉 where:
P is the non-empty finite set of players of the game,
G = 〈V,E〉 where the finite set V of vertices of G is equipped with a |P |-partition unionmultii∈PVi,
and E ⊆ V × V is the edge relation of G,
for each player i in P , pi is a payoff function that associates to every infinite path in G a
payoff in R.
Outcomes and histories. An outcome ρ of G is an infinite path in G, that is, an infinite
sequence of vertices ρ = (ρk)k∈N ∈ V ω, where for all k ∈ N, (ρk, ρk+1) ∈ E. The set of all
possible outcomes in G is denoted Out(G). A finite prefix of an outcome is called a history.
The set of all histories in G is denoted Hist(G). For an outcome ρ = (ρk)k∈N and an integer
`, we denote by ρ≤` the history (ρk)0≤k≤`. The length of the history ρ≤`, denoted |ρ≤`| is
`+ 1. Given an outcome or a history ρ and a history h, we write h ⊆pref ρ if h is a prefix of
ρ, and we denote by h−1.ρ the unique outcome (or history) such that ρ = h.(h−1.ρ). Given
an outcome ρ or a history h and k ∈ N (respectively k < |h|), we denote by ρk (respectively
hk) the k + 1-th vertex of ρ (respectively of h). For a history h, we define the last vertex
of h to be last(h) := h|h|−1 and its first vertex first(h) := h0. For a vertex v ∈ V , its set of
successors is Ev = {v′ ∈ V | (v, v′) ∈ E}.
Strategy profiles and payoffs. A strategy of a player i is a function σi that associates to
each history h such that last(h) ∈ Vi, a successor state v ∈ Elast(h). A tuple of strategies
(σi)i∈P ′ where P ′ ⊆ P , one for each player in P ′ is called a profile of strategies. Usually,
we focus on a particular player i, thus, given a profile (σi)i∈P , we write σ−i to designate
the collection of strategies of players in P \ {i}, and the complete profile is written (σi, σ−i).
The set of all strategies of player i is denoted Σi(G), while Σ(G) =
∏
i∈P Σi(G) is the
set of all profiles of strategies in the game G and Σ−i(G) is the set of all profiles of all
players except Player i. As we consider games with perfect information and deterministic
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transitions, any complete profile σP = (σi)i∈P yields, from any history h, a unique outcome,
denoted Outh(G, σP ). Formally, Outh(G, σP ) is the outcome ρ such that ρ≤|h|−1 = h and
for all k ≥ |h| − 1, for all i ∈ P , its holds that ρk+1 = σi(ρ≤k) if ρk ∈ Vi. The set of
outcomes (resp. histories) compatible with a strategy σ of player i after a history h is
Outh(G, σi) = {ρ ∈ | ∃σ−i ∈ Σ−i(G) such that ρ = Outh(G, (σi, σ−i))} (resp. Histh(σ) =
{h ∈ Hist(G) | ∃ρ ∈ Outh(G, σi), n ∈ N such that h = ρ≤n}). Each outcome ρ yields a
payoff pi(ρ) for each Player i. We denote with pi(h, σ, τ) the payoff of a profile of strategies
(σ, τ) after a history h.
Usually, we consider games instances such that players start to play at a fixed vertex.
Thus, we call an initialized game a pair (G, v0) of a game G and a vertex v0 ∈ V . When
the initial vertex v0 is clear from context, we speak directly from G, Out(G, σP ) and pi(σP )
instead of (G, v0), Outv0(G, σP ) and pi(v0, σP ).
Dominance relation. In order to compare different strategies of a player i in terms of
payoffs, we rely on the notion of dominance between strategies: A strategy σ ∈ Σi is weakly
dominated by a strategy σ′ ∈ Σi at a history h compatible with σ and σ′, denoted σ h σ′,
if for every τ ∈ Σ−i, we have pi(h, σ, τ) ≤ pi(h, σ′, τ). We say that σ is weakly dominated
by σ′, denoted σ  σ′ if σ v0 σ′, where v0 is the initial state of G. A strategy σ ∈ Σi is
dominated by a strategy σ′ ∈ Σi, at a history h compatible with σ and σ′, denoted σ ≺h σ′,
if σ h σ′ and there exists τ ∈ Σ−i, such that pi(h, σ, τ) < pi(h, σ′, τ). We say that σ is
dominated by σ′, denoted σ ≺ σ′ if σ ≺v0 σ′, where v0 is the initial state of G. Strategies
that are not dominated by any other strategies are called admissible: A strategy σ ∈ Σi is
admissible (respectively from h) if σ 6≺ σ′ (resp. σ 6≺h σ′) for every σ′ ∈ Σi.
Antagonistic and Cooperative Values To study the rationality of different behaviours in a
game G, it is useful to be able to know, for a player i, a fixed strategy σ ∈ Σi and any history
h, the worst possible payoff Player i can obtain with σ from h (i.e., the payoff he will obtain
assuming the other players play antagonistically), as well as the best possible payoff Player i
can hope for with σ from h (i.e., the payoff he will obtain assuming the other players play
cooperatively). The first value is called the antagonistic value of the strategy σ of Player i at
history h in G and the second value is called the cooperative value of the strategy σ of Player i
at history h in G. They are formally defined as aVali(G, h, σ) := infτ∈Σ−i pi(Outh(σ, τ)) and
cVali(G, h, σ) := supτ∈Σ−i pi(Outh(σ, τ)).
Prior to any choice of strategy of Player i, we can define, for any history h, the antagonistic
value of h for Player i as aVali(G, h) := supσ∈Σi aVali(G, h, σ) and the cooperative value of
h for Player i as cVali(G, h) := supσ∈Σi cVali(G, h, σ). Furthermore, one can ask, from a
history h, what is the maximal payoff one can obtain while ensuring the antagonistic value
of h. Thus, we define the antagonistic-cooperative value of h for Player i as acV ali(G, h) :=
sup{cVali(G, h, σ) | σ ∈ Σi and aVali(G, h, σ) ≥ aVali(G, h)}. From now on, we will omit
to precise G when it is clear from the context. Given a history h, we say that a strategy
σ of Player i is worst-case optimal if aVali(h, σ) = aVali(h), that it is cooperative optimal
if cVali(h, σ) = cVali(h) and worst-case cooperative optimal if aVali(h, σ) = aVali(h) and
cVali(h, σ) = acV ali(h).
An initialized game (G, v0) is well-formed for Player i if, for every history h ∈ Histv0(G),
there exists a strategy σ ∈ Σi such that aVali(h, σ) = aVal(h), and a strategy σ′ ∈ Σi such
that cVali(h, σ′) = cVal(h). In other words, at every history h, Player i has a strategy that
ensures the payoff aVali(h), and a strategy that allows the other players to cooperate to
yield a payoff of cV ai(h).
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v0 v1 `2`1
Figure 1 The Help-me?-game
In the following, we will always focus on the point of view of one player i, thus we will
sometimes refer to him as the protagonist and assume it is the first player, while the other
players −i can be seen as a coalition and abstracted to a single player, that we will call the
antagonist. Furthermore, we will omit the subscript i to refer to the protagonist when we
use the notations aVali, cVali, acV ali, pi, etc..
I Example 1. Consider the game depicted in Figure 1. The protagonist owns the circle
vertices. The payoffs are defined as follows for the protagonist :
p(ρ) =

0 if ρ = (v0v1)ω,
1 if ρ = (v0v1)nv0`ω1 where n ∈ N,
2 if ρ = (v0v1)n`ω2 where n ∈ N.
Let us first look at the possible behaviours of the protagonist in this game, when he makes
no assumption on the payoff function of the antagonist. He can choose to be “optimistic”
and opt to try (at least for some time, or forever) to go to v1 in the hope that the antagonist
will cooperate to bring him to `2, or settle from the start and go directly to `1, not counting
on any help from the antagonist. We denote by sk the strategy that prescribes to choose
v1 as the successor vertex at the first k visits of v0, and `1 at the k + 1-th visit, while sω
denotes the strategy that prescribes v1 at every visit of v0. Note that at history q0, the
strategy sω is cooperative optimal but not worst-case optimal (as the protagonist takes the
risk to get a payoff of 0 by staying forever in the loop q0q1), while the strategy s0 that
goes directly to `1 is worst-case optimal but not cooperative optimal. On the other hand,
strategies sk for k > 0 are worst-case cooperative optimal at q0: they allow the antagonist to
help reaching `2 but also ensure the payoff 1 by not letting the protagonist loop indefinitely
in q0q1. Fix k ∈ N. Then, sk ≺ sk+1: Indeed, for all τ ∈ Σ−i, if p(sk, τ) = 2, then there
exists j ≤ k such that τ((v0v1)j) = `2. As sk and sk+1 agree up to (v0v1)kq0, we have that
Out(sk+1, τ) = (v0v1)j`ω2 = Out(sk, τ), thus p(sk+1, τ) = 2 as well. Furthermore, consider
a strategy τ such that τ((v0v1)j) = v0 for all j ≤ k and τ((v0v1)k+1) = `2. Then p(sk, τ) = 1
while p(sk+1, τ) = 2. Finally, consider the strategy τ such that τ((v0v1)k) = v0 for all
k ∈ N. Then p(sk, τ) = 1 = p(sk+1, τ). Hence, sk ≺ sk+1. In addition, we observe that sω
is admissible: for any strategy sk, the strategy τ of the antagonist that moves to `2 at the
k + 1-th visit of v1 yields a payoff of 1 against strategy sk but 2 against strategy sω. Thus,
sω 6 sk for any k ∈ N.
Quantitative vs Boolean setting. Remark that in the boolean variant of the Help-me?
game considered in Example 1, where the payoff associated with the vertex `1 is 0 and the
payoff associated with the vertex `2 is 1, every strategy sk for k ∈ N is in fact dominated
by sω, as sk and sω both yield payoff 0 against τ such that τ((v0v1)k) = v0 for all k ∈ N.
In fact, Berwanger in [3], showed that boolean games with ω-regular objectives enjoy the
following fundamental property: every strategy is either admissible, or dominated by an
admissible strategy. The existence of an admissible strategy in any such game follows as an
immediate corollary.
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Let us now illustrate how admissibility fails to capture fully the notion of rational
behaviour in the quantitative case. Firstly, recall that the existence of admissible strategies is
not guaranteed in this setting (see for instance the examples given in [8]). In [8], the authors
identified a class of games for which the existence of admissible strategies (for Player i) is
guaranteed: well-formed games (for Player i). However, even in such games, the desirable
fundamental property that holds for boolean games is not assured to hold anymore. In
fact, this is already true for quantitative well-formed games with only three different payoffs
and really simple payoff functions. Indeed, consider again the Help-me? game in Figure 1.
Remark that it is a well-formed game for the protagonist. We already showed that any
strategy sk is dominated by the strategy sk+1. Thus, none of them is admissible. The only
admissible strategy is sω. It is easy to see that sk 6 sω for any k ∈ N: Let τ ∈ Σ−i be such
that τ((v0v1)k) = v0 for all k ∈ N. Then p(sk, τ) = 1 > 0 = p(sω, τ). To sum up, we see
that there exists an infinite sequence (sk)k∈N of strategies such that none of its elements
is dominated by the only admissible strategy sω. However, the sequence (sk)k∈N is totally
ordered by the dominance relation. Based on these observations, we take the approach to
not only consider single strategies, but also such ordered sequences of strategies, that can
represent a type of rational behaviour not captured by the admissibility concept.
2.2 Order theory
In this paragraph we recall the standard results from order theory that we need (see e.g. [16]).
A linear order is a total, transitive and antisymmetric relation. A linearly ordered set
(R,≺) is a well-order, if every subset of R has a minimal element w.r.t. ≺. The ordinals
are the canonical examples of well-orders, in as far as any well-order is order-isomorphic to
an ordinal. The ordinals themselves are well-ordered by the relation < where α ≤ β iff α
order-embeds into β. The first infinite ordinal is denoted by ω, and the first uncountable
ordinal by ω1.
A quasi order is a transitive and reflexive relation. Let (X,) be a quasi-ordered set.
A chain in (X,) is a subset of X that is totally ordered by . An increasing chain is an
ordinal-indexed family (xβ)β<α of elements of X such that β < γ < α ⇒ xβ ≺ xγ . If we
only have that β < γ implies xβ  xγ , we speak of a weakly increasing chain. We are mostly
interested in (weakly) increasing chains in this paper, and will thus occasionally suppress the
words weakly increasing and only speak about chains.
A subset Y of a quasi-ordered set (X,) is called cofinal, if for every x ∈ X there is
a y ∈ Y with x  y. A consequence of the axiom of choice is that every chain contains a
cofinal increasing chain, which is one reason for our focus on increasing chains. It is obvious
that having multiple maximal elements prevents the existence of a cofinal chain, but even a
lattice can fail to admit a cofinal chain. An example we will go back to is ω1 × ω (cf. [16]).
If (X,) admits a cofinal chain, then its cofinality (denoted by cof(X,)) is the least
ordinal α indexing a cofinal increasing chain in (X,). The possible values of the cofinality
are 1 or infinite regular cardinals (it is common to identify a cardinal and the least ordinal
of that cardinality). In particular, a countable chain can only have cofinality 1 or ω. The
first uncountable cardinal ℵ1 is regular, and cof(ω1) = ω1.
We will need the probably most-famous result from order theory:
I Lemma 2 (Zorn’s Lemma). If every chain in (X,) has an upper bound, then every
element of X is below a maximal element.
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3 Increasing chains of strategies
3.1 Ordering chains
In this subsection, we study the quasi-order of increasing chains in a given quasiorder (X,).
We denote by IC(X,) the set of increasing chains in (X,). Our intended application will
be that (X,) is the set of strategies for the protagonist in a game ordered by the dominance
relation. However, in this subsection we are not exploiting any properties specific to the
game-setting. Instead, our approach is purely order-theoretic.
I Definition 3. We introduce an order v on IC(X,) by defining:
(xβ)β<α v (yγ)γ<δ if ∀β < α ∃γ < δ xβ  yγ
Note that v is a partial order. Let .= denote the corresponding equivalence relation. We
will occasionally write short IC for (IC(X,),v).
Inspired by our application to dominance between strategies in games, we will refer to
both  and v as the dominance relation, and might express e.g. (xβ)β<α v (yγ)γ<δ as
(xβ)β<α is dominated by (yγ)γ<δ, or (yγ)γ<δ dominates (xβ)β<α. There is no risk to confuse
whether  or v is meant, since x  y iff (x)β<1 v (y)γ<1. Continuing the identification of
x ∈ X and (x)β<1 ∈ IC, we will later also speak about a single strategy dominating a chain
or vice versa.
The central notion we are interested in will be that of a maximal chain:
I Definition 4. A ∈ IC is called maximal, if A v B for B ∈ IC implies B v A.
We desire situations where every chain in IC is either maximal or below a maximal chain.
Noting that this goal is precisely the conclusion of Zorn’s Lemma (Lemma 2), we are led to
study chains of chains; for if every chain of chains is bounded, Zorn’s Lemma applies. Since
(IC,v) is a quasiorder just as (X,) is, notions such as cofinality apply to chains of chains
just as they apply to chains. We will gather a number of lemmas we need to clarify when
chains of chains are bounded.
In a slight abuse of notation, we write (xβ)β<α ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ iff {xβ | β < α} ⊆ {yγ | γ < δ}.
Clearly, (xβ)β<α ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ implies (xβ)β<α v (yγ)γ<δ. We can now express cofinality by
noting that (xβ)β<α is cofinal in (yγ)γ<δ iff (xβ)β<α ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ and (yγ)γ<δ v (xβ)β<α. We
recall that the cofinality of (yγ)γ<δ (denoted by cof((yγ)γ<δ) is the least ordinal α such that
there exists some (xβ)β<α which is cofinal in (yγ)γ<δ.
I Lemma 5. If (xβ)β<α .= (yγ)γ<δ, then there is some (y′λ)λ<α′ ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ with α′ ≤ α and
(y′λ)λ<α′
.= (yγ)γ<δ.
Proof. For each xβ , let γβ = min{γ | xβ  yγ}. By assumption, the set on the right hand
side is non-empty; and as it is a set of ordinals, it has a minimum. The set {yγβ | β < α} is
well-ordered by  (as a subset of a well-ordered set). Hence it can be turned into an increasing
chain (y′λ)λ<α′ . By construction, we have (y′λ)λ<α′ ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ and (xβ)β<α v (y′λ)λ<α′ . By
transitivity, it follows that (y′λ)λ<α′
.= (yγ)γ<δ.
It remains to argue that α′ ≤ α. For that, consider the map λ 7→ min{β | yγβ = y′λ}. This
map is well-defined, injective and preserves ≤. Thus, it constitutes an order-homeomorphism
from α′ to α, and witnesses that α′ ≤ α. J
I Corollary 6. cof((yγ)γ<δ) is equal to the least ordinal α such that there exists (xβ)β<α
with (xβ)β<α
.= (yγ)γ<δ.
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Proof. Since any increasing chain that is cofinal in (yγ)γ<δ is equivalent to (yγ)γ<δ, it follows
that cof((yγ)γ<δ) is an upper bound.
Conversely, if (xβ)β<α
.= (yγ)γ<δ, by Lemma 5 there is some (y′λ)λ<α′ ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ with α′ ≤
α and (y′λ)λ<α′
.= (yγ)γ<δ. By the definition of cofinality, we have that α′ ≥ cof((yγ)γ<δ),
so in particular, also α ≥ cof((yγ)γ<δ). J
I Corollary 7. For every chain (yγ)γ<δ there exists an equivalent chain (xβ)β<α such that
α = 1 or α is an infinite regular cardinal. In particular, if δ is countable, then (yγ)γ<δ is
equivalent to a singleton or some chain (xn)n<ω.
I Lemma 8. If (xβ)β<α v (yγ)γ<δ and α < cof((yγ)γ<δ), then there exists γ0 < δ such that
(xβ)β<α v (yγi)i<1
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 5: For each xβ , pick some γβ with xβ  yγβ . The set
{yγβ | β < α} is well-ordered by  (as a subset of a well-ordered set), and has cardinality at
most |α|. Hence there is some (y′β)β<α′ with |α′| ≤ |α|, (y′β)β<α′ ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ and (xβ)β<α v
(y′β)β<α′ .
By assumption, (y′β)β<α′ cannot be cofinal in (yγ)γ<δ. Thus, there has to be some γ0 < δ
such that for no β < α′ we have that yγ0  y′β . But as (yγ)γ<δ is totally ordered, this
implies that for all β < α we have y′β  yγ0 , i.e. (y′β)β<α′ v (yγi)i<1. The claim follows by
transitivity of v. J
We briefly illustrate the concepts introduced so far in the game setting. Notice that for
a game G and a Player i, the pair (Σi(G),) is indeed a quasi-ordered set. We can thus
consider the set IC(Σi(G),) of increasing chains of strategies in G.
I Example 9. Recall the Help-me? game of Figure 1 and consider the set (Σi,) of
strategies of the protagonist ordered by the weak dominance relation. Any single strategy
is an increasing chain, indexed by the ordinal 1. We already noted that the strategy sω is
admissible, thus the chain consisting of sω is maximal with respect to v. Furthermore, the
sequence of strategies (sk)k<ω is an increasing chain. Indeed, we know that for any k < ω,
we have sk ≺ sk+1. It is a maximal one: in fact, since the set of strategies of the protagonist
solely consists of the strategies of this chain and sω, and as sk 6 sω for any k < ω, we get
that any chain (σβ)β<α such that (sk)k<ω v (σβ)β<α satisfies (σβ)β<α ⊆ (sk)k<ω. Thus,
(σβ)β<α v (sk)k<ω. Let (σβ)β<α be an increasing chain indexed by the ordinal α. First,
remark that α ≤ ω. If α < ω, then the cofinality of (σβ)β<α is 1 as (σβ)β<α is equivalent to
the strategy σα−1. If α = ω, then the cofinality of (σβ)β<α is ω: As for every finite chain
(σ′β′)β′<α′ with 1 < α′ < ω, there exists n < ω such that (σ′β′)β′<α′ @ σn, and thus (σβ)β<α
is not (weakly) dominated by (σ′β′)β′<α′ . Moreover, we have that (σβ)β<α
.= (sk)k<ω and is
thus maximal. Indeed, since (σβ)β<α is a chain that is not a singleton, we already know that
(σβ)β<α ⊆ (sk)k<ω, that is (σβ)β<α v (sk)k<ω. Let now k < ω. As (σβ)β<α is an increasing
chain and α = ω, we have that there exists n < ω and k′ ≥ k such that σn = sk′ . Thus,
sk  σn since (sk)k<ω is an increasing chain. Hence, we also have (sk)k<ω v (σβ)β<α.
Now we are ready to prove the main technical result of this section 3.1, which identifies
the potential obstructions for each chain in IC to have an upper bound:
I Lemma 10. The following are equivalent:
1. If ((xγβ)β<αγ )γ<δ is an increasing chain in IC, then it has an upper bound in IC.
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2. If ((xγβ)β<α)γ<δ is an increasing chain in IC with α 6= δ, cof((xγβ)β<α) = α > 1 and
cof(((xγβ)β<α)γ<δ) = δ > 1, then it has an upper bound in IC.
Proof. It is clear that 2 is a special case of 1. We thus just need to show that any potential
obstruction to 1 can be assumed to have the form in 2.
By replacing each (xγβ)β<αγ with some suitable cofinal increasing chain if necessary, we
can assume that cof((xγβ)β<αγ ) = αγ for all γ < δ.
Consider {(xγβ)β<αγ | ∃γ′ > γ αγ < αγ′}. If this set is cofinal in ((xγβ)β<αγ )γ<δ, then for
each γ inside that set pick some witness γ′, and let yγ be the witness obtained from Lemma
8. Now {yγ | ∃γ′ > γ αγ < αγ′} is the desired upper bound.
If the set from the paragraph above is not cofinal, then there exists some δ′ < δ such that
for δ′ ≤ γ < γ′ < δ we always have that αγ ≥ αγ′ . As the αγ are ordinals, decreases can
happen only finitely many times. Thus, by moving to a suitable cofinal subset we can safely
assume that all αγ are equal to some fixed α.
Again by moving to a suitable cofinal subset, we can assume that cof(((xγβ)β<α)γ<δ) = δ.
If δ = 1, the statement is trivial. If α = 1, then (xγ0)γ<δ is the desired upper bound. It
remains to handle the case α = δ > 1.
We construct some function f : α→ α, such that the desired upper bound (y)<α is of
the form y = xf(). We proceed as follows: Set f(0) = 0. Once f(ζ) has been defined for
all ζ < , pick for each ζ <  some g(ζ) such that xζf(ζ)  xg(ζ) and xζ  xg(ζ). As  < α, it
cannot be that {xg(ζ) | ζ < } is cofinal in {xβ | β < α}. Thus, it has some upper bound,
and we define f() such that xf() is such an upper bound. J
Let us illustrate the problem of extending Lemma 10 by an example:
I Example 11 ([16, Example 1]). Let (X,) = ω1 × ω, i.e. the product order of the first
uncountable ordinal and the first infinite ordinal. Consider the chain of chains given by
xγn = (γ, n), this corresponds to the case α = ω, δ = ω1 in Lemma 10. If this chain of chains
had an upper bound, then ω1 × ω would need to admit a cofinal chain. However, this is not
the case.
However, we can guarantee the existence of a maximal chain above any chain when there
is no uncountable increasing chain of increasing chains.
I Theorem 12. If all increasing chains of elements in IC (i.e., increasing chains of increasing
chains of elements of (X,)) have a countable number of elements, then for every A ∈ IC
there exists a maximal B ∈ IC with A v B.
Proof. We first argue that Condition 2 in Lemma 10 is vacuously true. As all increasing
chains in IC are countable, the only possible value δ > 1 for δ = cof(((xγβ)β<α)γ<δ) is δ = ω.
As (X,) embeds into IC, if all chains in IC are countable, then so are all chains in (X,).
This tells us that the only possible value for α is α = ω. But then α 6= δ cannot be satisfied.
By Lemma 10, Condition 1 follows. We can then apply Zorn’s Lemma (Lemma 2) to
conclude the claim. J
A small modification of the example shows that we cannot replace the requirement that
IC has only countable increasing chains in Theorem 12 with the simpler requirement that
(X,) has only countable increasing chains:
I Example 13. Let X = ω1 × ω, and let (α, n) ≺ (β,m) iff α ≤ β and n < m. Then (X,)
has only countable increasing chains, but IC still has the chain of chains given by xγn = (γ, n)
as in Example 11.
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v0
v1 v2 `2`1
(a) A variant of the Help-me? game
with an extra loop
v0
v1
v2 `2`1
b
a
(b) A variant of the Help-me? game
with two paths from v0 to v2
Figure 2 Variants of the Help-me? game
3.2 Uncountably long chains of chains
Unfortunately, we can design a game such that there exists an uncountable increasing chain
of increasing chains. Thus the existence of a maximal element above any chain is not
guaranteed by Theorem 12. In fact, we will see that the chain of chains of uncountable length
we construct is not below any maximal chain.
I Example 14. We consider a variant of the Help-me? game (Example 1), depicted in
Figure 2a. The strategies of the protagonist in this game can be described by functions
f : N→ N ∪ {∞} describing how often the protagonist is willing to repeat the second loop
(between q1 and q2) given the number of repetitions the antagonist made in the first loop (at
q0). With the same reasoning as in Example 1 we find that the strategy corresponding to a
function g dominates the strategy corresponding to f iff ∀n ∈ N f(n) =∞⇔ g(n) =∞ and
∀n ∈ Nf(n) ≤ g(n).
I Definition 15. Let NN denote the set of functions f : N → N. For f, g ∈ NN, let f ≤ g
denote that ∀n ∈ N f(n) ≤ g(n).
I Observation 16. There is an embedding of (NN,≤) into the strategies of the game in
Example 14 ordered by dominance such that no strategy in the range of embedding is
dominated by a strategy outside the range of the embedding.
I Proposition 17 (2). For every chain (fn)n∈N in (NN,≤) there exists a chain of chains
((fαn )n<ω)α<ω1 of length ω1 with (f0n)n<ω w (fn)n<ω.
Proof. For each countable limit ordinal α, we fix3 some fundamental sequence (α[m])m<ω of
ordinals with α[m] < α and supm∈ω α[m] = α.
Let f0n(k) = max{f(k), k}. Let fα+1n (k) = maxj≤k(fαn+j)(k) + 1, and for limit ordinals α,
let fαn (k) = maxm≤n+k f
α[m]
n (k).
Claim: If α ≤ β, then (fαn )n<ω v (fβm)m<ω.
Proof. It suffices to show that if α ≤ β, then fαn ≤ fβn for all n greater than some t. If
β = α+ 1, this is immediate already for t = 0. For β a limit ordinal, we note that fβ[m]n ≤ fβn
for n ≥ m.
2 This result is adapted from an answer by user Deedlit on math.stackexchange.org [13].
3 We have no computability or other uniformity requirements to satisfy, and can thus just invoke the
axiom of choice. Otherwise, as discussed e.g. in [19, Section 3.1] this approach would fail.
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The claim then follows by induction over β. Recall that if β is a limit ordinal and α < β,
then there is some m ∈ ω with α ≤ β[m]. Since for any given α, β, the ordinals γ between
α and β we will need to inspect in the induction form a decreasing chain, there are only
finitely many such ordinals. In particular, the maximum of all thresholds t we encounter is
well-defined. J
Claim: If α > β, then (fαn )n<ω 6v (fβm)m<ω.
Proof. Due to transitivity of v and the previous claim, it suffices to show that (fα+1m )m<ω 6v
(fαn )n<ω. Write gn = fαn . Assume the contrary, i.e. that for all n < ω there exists some
m < ω such that for all k ∈ N and for all j ≤ k we have that gn+j(k) + 1 ≤ gm(k). In
particular, for n = 0 we would have that ∀k ∈ N ∀j ≤ k gj(k) + 1 ≤ gm(k), and then setting
k = j = m, that gm(m) + 1 ≤ gm(m), which is a contradiction. J
J
I Corollary 18. The game in Example 14 has uncountably long chains of chains not below
any maximal chains.
Proof. Combine Observation 16 and Proposition 17. J
3.3 Chains over countable quasiorders (X,)
Our proof of Proposition 17 crucially relied on functions of type f : N→ N with arbitrarily
high rate of growth. In concrete applications such functions would typically be unwelcome. In
fact, for almost all classes of games of interest in (theoretical) computer science, a countable
collection of strategies suffices for the players to attain their attainable goals. Restricting
to computable strategies often makes sense. Many games played on finite graphs are even
finite-memory determined (see [15] for how this extends to the quantitative case), and thus
strategies implementable by finite automata are all that need to be considered.
Restricting consideration to a countable set of strategies indeed circumvents the obstacle
presented by Proposition 17. The reason is that the cardinality of the length of a chain of
chains cannot exceed that of the underlying quasiorder (X,):
I Proposition 19. For any increasing chain ((xγβ)β<α)γ<δ in IC(X,) we find that |δ| ≤ |X|.
Proof. Let Xγ = {x ∈ X | ∃β < α x  xγβ}. We find that Xγ1 ( Xγ2 for any γ1 < γ2 < δ
as a direct consequence of (xγ1β )β<α @ (x
γ2
β )β<α. Pick for each γ < δ some yγ ∈ Xγ+1 \Xγ .
Then y· : δ → X is an injection, establishing |δ| ≤ |X|. J
I Corollary 20. If (X,) is countable, then any increasing chain is maximal or below a
maximal chain.
Proof. Proposition 19 shows that Theorem 12 applies. J
I Example 21. We return to the Help-me? game (Example 1, Figure 1). With the analysis
done in Example 9, we have seen that any increasing chain C is either maximal or such that
C v (σn)n<ω, which is maximal. This fact can be derived directly from Corollary 20 as the
number of strategies in G is countable. Note also that the seemingly irrelevant loop we added
in Figure 2a has a fundamental impact on the behaviour of chains of strategies!
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4 Generalised safety/reachability games
I Definition 22. A generalised safety/reachability game (for Player i) G = 〈P,G,L, (pi)i∈P 〉
is a turn-based multiplayer game on a finite graph such that:
L ⊆ V is a finite set of leaves,
for each ` ∈ L, we have that (`, v) ∈ E if, and only if v = `, that is, each leaf is equipped
with a self-loop, and no other outgoing transition,
for each ` ∈ L, there exists an associated payoff n` ∈ Z such that: for each outcome ρ,
we have pi(ρ) =
{
n` if ρ ∈ V ∗`ω,
0 otherwise.
The traditional reachability games can be recovered as the special case where all leaves
are associated with the same positive payoff, whereas the traditional safety games are those
generalised safety/reachability games with a single negative payoff attached to leaves. This
class was studied under the name chess-like games in [4, 5].
Generalised safety/reachability games are well-formed for Player i. Furthermore, they
are prefix-independent, that is, for any outcome ρ and history h, we have that pi(hρ) = pi(ρ).
Without loss of generality, we consider that there is either a unique leaf `(n) ∈ L or no leaf
for each possible payoff n ∈ Z.
It follows from the transfer theorem in [15] (in fact, already from the weaker transfer
theorem in [11]) that generalised safety/reachability games are finite memory determined.
With a slight modification, we see that for any history h and strategy σ, there exists a
finite-memory strategy σ′ such that cVal(h, σ′) = cVal(h, σ) and aVal(h, σ′) = aVal(h, σ).
We shall thus restrict our attention to finite memory strategies, of which there are only
countably many. We then obtain immediately from Corollary 20:
I Corollary 23. In a generalised safety/reachability game, every increasing chain comprised
of finite memory strategies is either maximal or dominated by a maximal such chain.
If our goal is only to obtain a dominance-related notion of rationality, then for generalised
safety/reachability games we can be satisfied with maximal chains comprised of finite memory
strategies. However, for applications, it would be desirable to have a concrete understanding
of these maximal chains. For this, having used Zorn’s Lemma in the proof of their existence
surely is a bad omen!
After collecting some useful lemmas on dominance in generalised safety/reachability
games in Section 4.1, we will introduce the notion of uniform chains in Section 4.2. These
are realized by automata of a certain kind, and thus sufficiently concrete to be amenable to
algorithmic manipulations.
4.1 Dominance in generalised safety/reachability games
Given a generalised safety/reachability game G and two strategies σ1 and σ2 of Player i, we
can provide a criterion to show that σ1 is not dominated by σ2:
I Lemma 24. Let σ1 and σ2 be two strategies of Player i in a generalised safety/reachability
game G. Then, σ1 6 σ2 if, and only if, there exists a history h compatible with σ1 and σ2
such that last(h) ∈ Vi, σ1(h) 6= σ2(h) and cVal(h, σ1) > aVal(h, σ2).
Intuitively, if there is no history where the two strategies disagree, they are in fact
equivalent, and if, at every history where they disagree, the best payoff σ1 can achieve (that
is, cVal(h, σ1)) is less than the one σ2 can ensure (that is, aVal(h, σ2)), then σ1  σ2. On
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the other hand, if they disagree at a history h and the best payoff σ1 can achieve is strictly
greater than the one σ2 can ensure, then there exist a strategy of the antagonist that will
yield exactly these payoffs against σ1 and σ2 respectively, which means that σ1 6 σ2. This
result follows from the proof of Theorem 11 in [8]. The proof adapted to our setting can be
found in the appendix.
Proof of Lemma 24.=⇒ Suppose that for every history h compatible with σ1 and σ2 such
that last(h) ∈ Vi and σ1(h) 6= σ2(h), we have that cVal(h, σ1) ≤ aVal(h, σ2). We
show that σ1  σ2. Let τ be a strategy of Player −i. Consider ρ1 = Out(σ1, τ) and
ρ2 = Out(σ2, τ). If for all prefixes h′ ⊆pref ρ1 such that last(h′) ∈ Vi, it holds that
σ1(h′) = σ2(h′), then in fact ρ1 = ρ2 and pi(σ1, τ) = pi(σ2, τ). Otherwise, let h be the
least common prefix of ρ1 and ρ2 such that last(h) ∈ Vi and σ1(h) 6= σ2(h). We know
that pi(ρ1) ≤ cVal(h, σ1) and pi(ρ2) ≥ aVal(h, σ2) since h ⊆pref ρ1 and h ⊆pref ρ2. As
cVal(h, σ1) ≤ aVal(h, σ2), we have that pi(σ1, τ) ≤ pi(σ2, τ). Thus, for every τ ∈ Σ−i, it
holds that pi(σ1, τ) ≤ pi(σ2, τ), that is, σ1  σ2.
⇐= Let h be a history compatible with σ1 and σ2 such that last(h) ∈ Vi, σ1(h) 6= σ2(h) and
cVal(h, σ1) > aVal(h, σ2). Then, there exists two strategies τ1 and τ2 of player −i such
that pi(h, σ1, τ1) = cVal(h, σ1) and pi(h, σ2, τ2) = aVal(h, σ2). Let τ be a strategy of
player −i compatible with h, and define τ ′(h′) =

τ1(h′) if hσ1(h) ⊆pref h′,
τ2(h′) if hσ2(h) ⊆pref h′,
τ(h′) otherwise.
The strategy τ ′ is well defined, as σ1(h) 6= σ2(h). Furthermore, we have that pi(σ1, τ ′) =
pi(h, σ1, τ1) = cVal(h, σ1) > aVal(h, σ2) = pi(h, σ2, τ2) = pi(σ2, τ ′), since generalised
safety/reachability games are prefix-independent. Thus, σ1 6 σ2.
J
We call such a history h a non-dominance witness of σ1 by σ2. The existence of non-
dominance witnesses allows us to conclude that in generalised safety/reachability games, all
increasing chains are countable (not just those comprised of finite memory strategies).
I Corollary 25. If (σβ)β<α is an increasing chain in generalised safety/reachability game,
then α is countable.
Proof. Assume that a history h is a witness of non-dominance of σ2 by σ1, and of σ3 by σ2,
but not of σ1 by σ2 or σ2 by σ3. Then cVal(h, σ2) > aVal(h, σ1), cVal(h, σ3) > aVal(h, σ2),
cVal(h, σ1) ≤ aVal(h, σ2) and cVal(h, σ2) ≤ aVal(h, σ3). It follows that aVal(h, σ1) <
aVal(h, σ3) and cVal(h, σ1) < cVal(h, σ3). Thus, if there are k different possible values, then
any increasing chain of strategies using h as witness of non-dominance between them can
have length at most 2k − 1.
But if there were an uncountably long increasing chain, by the pigeon hole principle it
would have an uncountably long subchain where all non-dominance witnesses in the reverse
direction are given by the same history. J
As we only handle countable chains, in the following we use the usual notation (σn)n∈N
to index chains.
The following lemma states that we can also extract witnesses for a strategy to be
non-maximal (non-admissible or strictly dominated):
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I Lemma 26. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game and σ a strategy of Player i.
The strategy σ is not admissible if, and only if there exists a history h compatible with σ such
that aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h) ≤ acV al(h) where at least one inequality is strict.
This result is a reformulation of Theorem 11 in [8] catered to our context and with a focus
on the non-admissibility rather than on admissibility. For the proof, we use the following
notation: Given two strategies σ, σ′ of Player i, and a history h, σ[h ← σ′] denotes the
strategy that follows σ and shifts to σ′ at history h. Formally, for all histories h′ ∈ Hist(G),
the strategy σ[h← σ′] is such that:
σ[h← σ′](h′) =
{
σ′(h′) if h ⊆pref h′,
σ(h′) otherwise .
Proof of Lemma 26. ⇐ Let σ′h be a strategy compatible with h such that aVal(h, σ′h) =
aVal(h) and cVal(h, σ′h) = acVal(h). Let σ′ be the strategy that follows σ and switches
to σ′h at history h, that is, σ′ = σ[h → σ′h]. We claim that σ ≺ σ′. Indeed, we
know that aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h) ≤ acVal(h). For every strategy τ ∈
Σ−i, if h 6⊆pref Outσ, τ , by definition of σ′, we have that Outσ′, τ = Outσ, τ , thus
pi(σ, τ) = pi(σ′, τ). If h ⊆pref Outσ, τ , then h ⊆pref Outσ′, τ andOutσ′, τ = Outh, σ′h, τ .
Hence aVal(h, σ) ≤ pi(σ, τ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, σ′h) = aVal(h, σ′) ≤ pi(σ′, τ) ≤
cVal(h, σ′h) = cVal(σ′, τ) . Thus, σ  σ′. Furthermore, there is a strict inequality
in aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h) ≤ acVal(h). Hence, there exists τ such that
h ⊆pref Outσ, τ and pi(σ, τ) < pi(σ′, τ).
⇒ Let σ′ be such that σ ≺ σ′. In particular, σ  σ′. By Lemma 24, we know that there
exists a history h compatible with σ and σ′ such that last(h) ∈ Vi, σ(h) 6= σ(h) and
cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, σ′). Since the domination is strict between σ and σ′, we further
know that the sequence of inequalities aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, σ′) ≤ cVal(h, σ′)
with at least one strict inequality holds. Towards contradiction, we assume that the
chain of inequalities aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h) ≤ acVal(h) where at least one
inequality is strict does not hold. That is, either aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h) =
acVal(h) or cVal(h, σ) > aVal(h). Suppose that aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h) =
acVal(h). As aVal(h, σ′) ≤ aVal(h), we have that aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h, σ′) <
cVal(h, σ′). Since σ′ guarantees aVal(h), we know that cVal(h, σ′) ≤ acVal(h). Thus
acVal(h) = aVal(h) < cVal(h, σ′) ≤ acVal(h), which is a contradiction. Suppose now that
cVal(h, σ) > aVal(h). As aVal(h, σ′) ≤ aVal(h), it follows that cVal(h, σ) > aVal(h, σ′),
which contradicts the fact that cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, σ′).
J
I Definition 27. Call a history h as in Lemma 26 a non-admissibility witness for σ. Call
σ preadmissible, if for every non-admissibility witness hv of σ we find that h = h′vh′′ with
aVal(h′v, σ) = aVal(h′v) and cVal(h′v, σ) = acV al(h′v).
While a preadmissible strategy may fail to be admissible, it is not possible to improve
upon it the first time it enters some vertex. Only when returning to a vertex later it may
make suboptimal choices. Moreover, before a dominated choice is possible at a vertex,
previously both the antagonistic and the antagonistic-cooperative value were realized at that
vertex by the preadmissible strategy.
I Lemma 28. In a generalised safety/reachability game, every strategy is either preadmissible
or dominated by a preadmissible strategy.
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Proof. For each vertex v in the game, we fix a finite memory strategy τv that realizes aVal(v)
and acV al(v). Note that since generalised safety/reachability games are prefix independent,
values depend only on the current vertex, but not on the entire history.
We start with a finite memory strategy σ. If it is not already preadmissible, then it has
witnesses of non-admissibility violating the desired property. Whether a history h is a witness
of non-admissibility for a finite memory strategy σ depends only on the last vertex of h and
the current state of σ. We now modify σ such that whenever σ is in a combination of vertex
v and state s corresponding to a problematic witness of non-admissibility, the new strategy
σ′ moves to playing τv instead. The choices of v, s and τk ensure that σ′ dominates σ.
The new strategy σ′ may fail to be preadmissible, again, and we repeat the construction.
Now any problematic history in σ′ needs to enter the automaton for some τv at some point.
By choice of τv, the history where τv has just been entered cannot be a witness of non-
admissibility. It follows that a problematic history entering τv cannot end in v. Repeating
the updating process for at most as many times as there are vertices in the game graph will
yield a preadmissible finite memory strategy dominating σ. J
I Lemma 29. If h is not a witness of non-admissibility of σ, and not a witness of non-
dominance of σ by τ , then h is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ.
Proof of Lemma 29. To even be a candidate for a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ, h
needs to be compatible with σ and τ and satisfy last(h) ∈ V1, σ(h) 6= τ(h). Not being a witness
of non-dominance of σ by τ then implies cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, τ). It follows in particular
that aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, τ) ≤ aVal(h) ≤ acVal(h). The only way h can not
be a witness of non-admissibility of σ is if aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h, τ) = aVal(h) =
acVal(h). Since aVal(h, τ) = aVal(h), it follows that cVal(h, τ) ≤ acVal(h, τ) = aVal(σ),
i.e. h is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ. J
I Lemma 30. Given an initialized game with initial vertex v0, the following holds: If for two
strategies σ and τ it holds that for any maximal history h compatible with both, there is a prefix
h′ with aVal(h′, σ) = aVal(h′, τ) and cVal(h′, σ) = cVal(h′, τ), then aVal(v0, σ) = aVal(v0, τ)
and cVal(v0, σ) = cVal(v0, τ).
Proof. Assume for the sake of a contradiction that aVal(v0, σ) < aVal(v0, τ). Then there is a
real r ∈ R, and a strategy pi of the antagonist such that for any strategy pi′ of the antagonist
p(Out(σ, pi)) < r ≤ p(Out(τ, pi′)). If Out(σ, pi) = Out(τ, pi), this is clearly impossible.
Thus, Out(σ, pi) and Out(τ, pi) have some longest common prefix h, which is a maximal
history compatible with σ and τ (for it must be the protagonist who behaves differently first
in Out(σ, pi) and Out(τ, pi)).
By assumption, h has a prefix h′ with aVal(h′, σ) = aVal(h′, τ). Now aVal(h′, σ) ≤
p(Out(σ, pi)) < r. If aVal(h′, τ) < r, then the antagonist must have a strategy pi′′ such that
h′ is a prefix of Out(τ, pi′′) and p(Out(τ, pi′′)) < r. But that contradictions r ≤ p(Out(τ, pi′))
holding for all pi′.
The proof for the cooperative value in place of the antagonistic one proceeds analogously.
J
I Lemma 31. Given an initialized game with initial vertex v0, the following holds: If σ is
preadmissible and σ  τ , then aVal(v0, σ) = aVal(v0, τ) and cVal(v0, σ) = cVal(v0, τ).
Proof. We show that the conditions of Lemma 30 are satisfied, which will imply our desired
conclusion. Consider a maximal history h compatible with both σ and τ . First, assume that
h is not a witness of non-admissibility of σ. Since σ  τ , by Lemma 24 h cannot be a witness
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of non-dominance of σ by τ , i.e. cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, τ). By Lemma 29, it follows that h is
not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ either, i.e. cVal(h, τ) ≤ aVal(h, σ). Put together,
we have aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h, τ) = cVal(h, τ).
It remains the case where h is a witness of non-admissibility of σ. Then by preadmissibility
of σ, h has some prefix h′ with aVal(h′, σ) = aVal(h′) and cVal(h′, σ) = acVal(h′). Since σ 
τ , we must have aVal(h′, σ) ≤ aVal(h′, τ), so it follows that aVal(h′, σ) = aVal(h′, τ), and then
that cVal(h′, τ) ≤ acVal(h′) = cVal(h′, σ) ≤ cVal(h′, τ), i.e. cVal(h′, σ) = cVal(h′, τ). J
4.2 Parameterized automata and uniform chains
Let a parameterized automaton be a Mealy automaton that in addition can access a single
counter in the following way: In a counter-access-state, a transition is chosen based on
whether the counter value is 0 or not. Otherwise, the counter is decremented by 1.
I Definition 32. A parameterized automaton for Player i ∈ P over a game graph G = (V,E)
is a tupleM = (M,MC ,m0, V, µ, ν) where:
M is a non-empty finite set of memory states and MC ⊆M is the set of counter-access
states,
m0 is the initial memory state,
V is the set of vertices of G,
µ : M × V × N→M × N is the memory and counter update function,
ν : M ×Vi×N→ V is the move choice function for Player i, such that (v, ν(m, v, k)) ∈ E
for all m ∈M and v ∈ Vi and n ∈ N.
The memory and counter-update function µ respects the following conditions: for each
m ∈M \MC , and v ∈ V , there exists m′ ∈M such that µ(m, v, n) = (m′, n) for all n ∈ N.
for each m ∈ MC , and v ∈ V , there exists m′ ∈ M such that µ(m, v, n) = (m′, n − 1) for
all n > 0 and m′′ ∈M such that µ(m, v, 0) = (m′′, 0). The move choice function ν respects
the following conditions: for each m ∈ M \MC , and v ∈ Vi, there exists v′ ∈ V such that
ν(m, v, n) = v′ for all n ∈ N. for each m ∈MC , and v ∈ Vi, there exists m′ ∈M such that
ν(m, v, n) = (m′, n) for all n > 0 and m′′ ∈M such that ν(m, v, 0) = (m′′, 0).
To ease presentation and understanding, we call transitions that decrement the counter
green transitions, the transitions only taken when the counter value is 0 red transitions,
and the ones that do not depend on the counter value black transitions. This classification
between green, red and black transitions extends naturally to the edges of the productM×G
(that is, the graph with set of vertices M × V and edges induced by the functions µ and ν).
Parameterized automata can be seen as a collection of finite Mealy automata, one for
each initialization of the counter. Thus, we say that a parameterized automatonM realizes
a sequence of finite-memory strategies (σn)n∈N. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on
chains realized by parameterized automata:
I Definition 33. Let a chain (σn)n∈N of regular strategies be called a uniform chain if there
is a parameterized automaton M that realizes σn if the counter is initialized with the value
n. If (σn)n∈N is maximal for v amongst the increasing chains comprised of finite memory
strategies, we call it a a maximal uniform chain.
I Example 34. The Help-me? game from Figure 1 is clearly a generalised safety/reachability
game with two leaves. The chain of strategies (sk)k∈N exposed in Example 1 is a uniform
chain, as it is realized by the parameterized automaton that loops k times when its counter is
initialized with value k. Figure 3 shows the product between this parameterized automaton
and the game graph. The green edge corresponds to the transition to take when the counter
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value is greater than 0 and should be decremented, while the red edge corresponds to the
transition to take when the counter value is 0.
q0 q1 `(2)`(1)
Figure 3 Product of the Help-me? game with parameterized automaton with a single memory
state realizing (sk)k∈N
The following theorem shows us that uniform chains indeed suffice to realize any rational
behaviour in the sense of maximal chains:
I Theorem 35. In a generalised safety/reachability game, every dominated finite memory
strategy is dominated by an admissible finite memory strategy or by a maximal uniform chain.
Proof. By Lemma 28 it suffices to prove the claim for preadmissible strategies (Definition
27). We thus start with a preadmissible finite memory strategy σ.
By the prefix-independence of generalised safety/reachability games, for any combination
of vertex v in the game and state s in the automaton realizing σ, either a history ending in
v and state s is a witness for non-admissibility of σ or not. Let N be the set of such pairs
corresponding to non-admissibility witnesses. By the definition of preadmissibility, we cannot
reach any (v, s) ∈ N without first passing through some (v, siv) with aVal(v, siv) = aVal(v)
and cVal(v, siv) = acV al(v, siv). By expanding the automaton if necessary (to remember
where we were when first encountering some vertex), we can assume that for any (v, s) ∈ N
there is canonic choice of prior (v, siv).
We now construct either a parameterized automaton from σ that either realizes a single
maximal strategy, or a maximal uniform chain. If N is empty, we are done. Otherwise,
consider (v, s) ∈ N and the corresponding (v, siv), and compare the associated values: Since
the antagonist can reach (v, s) from (v, siv), it has to hold that aVal(v, siv) ≤ aVal(v, s) ≤
cVal(v, s) ≤ cVal(v, siv). By choice of (v, siv), we have aVal(v, s) ≤ aVal(v) = aVal(v, siv), and
thus aVal(v, siv) = aVal(v, s). Since (v, s) ∈ N , we see that even aVal(v, siv) = aVal(v, s) =
cVal(v, s) < cVal(v, siv) holds by Lemma 26.
If aVal(v, siv) ≤ 0, we modify the automaton to act in (v, s) as it does in (v, siv). If
aVal(v, siv), then we add green edges to let the automaton act in (v, s) as in (v, siv), and red
edges to act as it would do originally. The comparison of the values lets us conclude via
Lemma 24 that the parameterized automatonM either realizes a single strategy dominated
σ, or a uniform chain dominating σ.
It remains to argue that the strategy/uniform chain realized byM is maximal. Let σn
be the strategy whereM is initialized with n ∈ N (wlog assume that n is larger than the
size of M). Assume that τ  σn, and let h be a witness of τ  σn according to Lemma
24, i.e. satisfying cVal(h, τ) > aVal(h, σn). Since σn  τ , we have cVal(h, σn) ≤ aVal(h, τ),
so aVal(h, σn) ≤ cVal(h, σn) ≤ aVal(h, τ) ≤ cVal(h, τ) with one inequality being strict. In
particular, h is a witness of non-admissibility of σn. By construction ofM, h must already
have been a witness of non-admissibility of σ, and the next move after h must be given by
a red edge. This already implies that ifM realizes a single strategy, then that strategy is
maximal.
Let m be the size of the parameterized automatonM, let t be the size of the automaton
realizing τ , and N = mt+ 1. We compare σN and τ by considering the maximal histories
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compatible with both. If there were such a history hv compatible with both σN and τ where
σN is about to apply a red edge, then it has to hold that on histories extending hv, τ always
acts at v asM does following a green edge, for τ cannot count up to N (in particular, h is
maximal for being compatible with τ and σN ). It follows that aVal(hv, τ) ≤ 0. Let h′v be
a prefix of this form of hv compatible with σn not ending in a red edge (this exists, since
n > m). Then aVal(h′v, τ) ≤ 0, and since τ  σn, aVal(h′v, σn) = aVal(v, siv) ≤ 0. But then
when constructingM, we would not have placed red and green edges at (v, siv), leading to a
contradiction. Thus, at any maximal history compatible with σN and τ , σN will follow a
green or black edge next.
If τ is part of a chain (τi)i∈N with (σi)i∈N v (τi)i∈N, then τ and σN have a common upper
bound τ ′. If some maximal history h compatible with both σN and τ is not compatible with τ ′,
then h has a longest prefix h′ compatible with τ ′. If h is compatible with τ ′, but τ ′(h) 6= σN (h),
we set h′ = h. As shown above, h′ cannot be a witness of non-admissibility of σN , and by
Lemma 24 it cannot be a witness of non-dominance of σN by τ ′, since σN  τ ′. Lemma 29 then
gives us that h′ is not a witness of non-dominance of τ ′ by σN , i.e. cVal(h′, τ ′) ≤ aVal(h′, σN ).
Together with σN  τ ′ we get that aVal(h′, σN ) = cVal(h′, σN ). Since h is compatible with
σN and extends h′, it follows that aVal(h′, σN ) = aVal(h, σN ) = cVal(h, σN ). Since τ  τ ′,
it follows that cVal(h′, τ) ≤ cVal(h′, τ ′) = aVal(h′, σN ). Since h is compatible with τ and
extends h′, it follows that cVal(h, τ) ≤ cVal(h′, τ) ≤ aVal(h′, σN ) = aVal(h, σN ), i.e. that h
is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σN .
The remaining case we need to consider is that where h is compatible with τ ′ and
τ ′(h) = σN (h). Consider the subgame starting after that move. Since we have chosen N
sufficiently big, in this subgame it is impossible for σN to pass through a red edge without
passing through a green edge at the same vertex. By construction, this ensures that σN is
still preadmissible in this subgame. Since reaching the subgame is compatible with τ ′ and σN ,
restricting to this subgame, we still have that σN  τ ′. Thus, we can apply Lemma 31 to the
subgame, and conclude that aVal(h, τ ′) = aVal(h, σN ) and cVal(h, τ ′) = cVal(h, σN ). Since
h cannot be a witness of non-dominance of τ by τ ′, it holds that cVal(h, τ) ≤ aVal(h, τ ′) =
aVal(h, σN ). Thus, h is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σN either.
As we have ruled out all candidates for witnesses of non-dominance of τ by σN , by Lemma
24 we may conclude that τ  σN . J
Theorem 35 cannot be extended to state that every chain comprised of finite memory
strategies is below an admissible strategy or a maximal uniform chain. Note that there are
only countably many uniform chains.
I Example 36. There is a generalised safety/reachability game where there are uncountably
many incomparable maximal chains of finite memory strategies.
Proof. Consider the game depicted in Figure 2b. For any p ∈ {a, b}ω, define a chain of finite
memory strategies by letting the n-strategy be loop n times while playing the symbols from
p≤n, then quit. For each p, we obtain a different maximal chain. J
The particular structure of parameterized automata over safety/reachability game graphs
lets us point out useful properties and patterns, that we present before tackling algorithmic
properties in the next section. Notice that for each path h˜ inM×G, there exists a unique
corresponding path h in G, as there may exist a transition between (m, v) and (m′, v′) in
M×G only if (v, v′) ∈ E, by definition of the product.
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I Definition 37. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game andM be a parameterized
automaton over the game graph G. Then, we say that a (finite or infinite) path h˜ in the
productM×G is valid if it respects the following two conditions:
1. there is a finite number of green transitions in h˜, and
2. no green transition appears after a red transition in h˜.
If a path h˜ is valid then there exists a strategy in the sequence realized by M that is
compatible with the corresponding path h in G. Furthermore, if h˜ does not contain any
red transition, then h is compatible with an infinite number of histories in the sequence,
namely all strategies corresponding to the counter initialized to a value greater than the
number of green transitions in h˜. For a valid path h˜, let |h˜|g denote the number of green
transitions in h˜, and |h˜|r the number of red transitions in h˜. Furthermore, a valid path h˜
can be decomposed in two valid paths, that is, h˜ = h˜gh˜r where |h˜g|r = 0 and |h˜r|g = 0, such
that (h˜r)0 = (µ(last(h˜g), 0), ν(last(h˜g), 0)). If |h˜|r = 0, we have h˜ = h˜g and h˜r = ε.
I Lemma 38. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game and M be a parameterized
automaton over the game graph G. Let h˜ be a valid path inM×G such that h˜0 = (m0, v0)
and let k ∈ N. Then, the history h is compatible with σk if, and only if, |h˜|r = 0 and k ≥ |h˜|g,
or |h˜|r > 0 and k = |h˜|g.
Proof. Let h˜ be a valid path inM×G and let k ∈ N.
⇒ Assume that the history h is compatible with σk.
1. If |h˜|r = 0, and k < |h˜|g, then there exists n < |h˜| such that |h˜≤n|g = k and
σk(h≤n) = ν(h˜n, 0). Since h˜ is a valid path, by condition 2. in Definition 37, we
have that h˜n+1 = (µ(h˜n, 1), ν(h˜n, 1)). Hence hn+1 = ν(h˜n, 1) and we have that
hn+1 = ν(h˜n, 1) 6= ν(h˜n, 0) = σk(h˜≤n). That is, h is not compatible with σk which is
a contradiction.
2. If |h˜|r > 0, and k 6= |h˜|g, we have two cases: If k < |h˜|g, there exists a smallest
n < |h˜| such that |h˜≤n|g = k, and σk(h˜≤n) = ν(h˜n, 0). Since h˜ is a valid path and
k < |h˜|g, by condition 2. in Definition 37, we have that h˜n+1 = (µ(h˜n, 1), ν(h˜n, 1)).
Hence hn+1 = ν(h˜n, 1) and we have that hn+1 = ν(h˜n, 1) 6= ν(h˜n, 0) = σk(h≤n). That
is, h is not compatible with σk which is a contradiction. If k > |h˜|g, there exists a
smallest n < |h˜| such that h˜n+1 = (µ(h˜n, 0), ν(h˜n, 0)). Since k > |h˜|g, we have that
σk(h≤n) = ν(h˜≤n, 1). Hence we have that hn+1 = ν(h˜n, 0) 6= ν(h˜n, 1) = σk(h≤n).
That is, h is not compatible with σk which is a contradiction.
⇐ 1. Assume |h˜|r = 0 and k ≥ |h˜|g. Then for all n < |h˜| such that h˜n ∈M×Vi, we have that
h˜n+1 = (µ(h˜n, 1), ν(h˜n, 1)). Since k ≥ |h˜|g, we also have that σk(hn) = ν(h˜n, 1) = hn+1
(that is, the counter value cannot have been decremented k times by following h˜) . As
h˜0 = (m0, v0), it follows that h˜ is indeed compatible with σk.
2. Assume |h˜|r > 0 and k = |h˜|g. Recall that h˜ can be decomposed in h˜gh˜r where |h˜g|r = 0
and |h˜r|g = 0, such that (h˜r)0 = (µ(last(h˜g), 0), ν(last(h˜g), 0)). As |h˜g|g = |h˜|g = k
by case 1. above, we know that hg is compatible with σk. Furthermore, the counter
value at last(hg) is 0 when initialized at k. Thus, for all |h˜g| ≤ n < |h˜| such that
h˜n ∈ M × Vi, we have that h˜n+1 = (µ(h˜n, 0), ν(h˜n, 0)). Consequently, we also have
that σk(hn) = ν(h˜n, 0) = hn+1 (that is, the counter value has reached 0 after h˜g and
then follows h˜r). As h˜0 = (m0, v0), it follows that h˜ is indeed compatible with σk.
J
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4.3 Algorithmic properties
In this section, we prove two decidability results concerning parametrized automata.
First, we prove that we can decide whether the sequence of strategies realized by a
parameterized automaton is a chain. Note that this decision problem is not trivial: not every
parameterized automaton realizes an (increasing) chain of strategies. For instance, if we
switch the red and green transitions in the automaton/game graph product of figure 3, the
sequence of strategies realized consists of sω when the counter is initialized with value 0, and
s0 when it is initialized with any other value. As sω 6 s0, it is not a chain.
Second, we demonstrate that we can compare uniform chains: given two parametrized
automata defining chains of strategies, we can decide whether one is dominated by the other.
We begin by proving that strategies realized by Mealy automata are comparable.
I Lemma 39. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game, let σ and σ′ be finite-memory
strategies realized by the finite Mealy automataM andM′. It is decidable in PTime whether
σ  σ′.
Proof. We construct the game G′ of perfect information for two players, Challenger and
Prover, such that Prover wins the game if and only if σ  σ′. Let µM and νM be the memory
update and move choice functions ofM, and let µM′ and νM′ be the memory update and
move choice functions of M′. Formally, the game G′ = 〈P ′, G′,WC〉 is such that the set
of players P ′ is composed of Challenger and Prover, and the game graph G′ = (V ′, E′) is
composed of:
a copy of the graph (M×G×M′),
for each c ∈ L ∪ {0}, a copy (M×G)c of the graph (M×G),
for each a ∈ L ∪ {0}, a copy (M′ ×G)a of the graph (M′ ×G),
for each pair (c, a) ∈ L∪{0}×L∪{0} such that c > a, and for each vertex (mM, v,mM′)
of the graph (M×G×M′) such that Succ(mM, v,mM′) = ∅:
a vertex (c, a,mM, v,mM′),
an edge ((mM, v,mM′), (c, a,mM, v,mM′)),
an edge ((c, a,mM, v,mM′), (m′M, v′)c) where (m′M, v′) = (µM(mM, v), νM(mM, v))
(ie, (m′M, v′) is the successor of (mM, v) in (M×G)),
an edge ((c, a,mM, v,mM′), (m′M′ , v′)a), where (m′M′ , v′) = (µM′(mM′ , v), νM′(mM′ , v))
(ie, (m′M′ , v′) is the successor of (mM′ , v) in (M′ ×G)).
All vertices in V ′ belong to Challenger except the ones of the form (c, a,mM, v,mM′),
that belong to Prover. As the sets L ∪ {0} is finite, there are also a finitely many pairs
(c, a) ∈ L ∪ {0} × L ∪ {0} such that c > a. Thus, we see that we wind up with a game graph
G′ polynomial in the size of the original strategy automataM andM′ and game graph G.
The winning condition WC for Challenger can be expressed as a boolean combination
of safety and reachability conditions. First, Challenger must reach a vertex of the form
(c, a,mM, v,mM′). Then, if both c, a 6= 0 he must reach either any vertex of the form
(mM, `(c))c in (M× G)c, or reach any vertex of the form (mM′ , `(a))a in (M′ × G)a. If
c = 0 and a 6= 0, he must either:
reach any vertex in (M× G)c (to ensure he is playing in the subgame C) and be safe
from all vertices of the form (mM, `(x))c with x 6= 0 in (M×G)c,
or reach any vertex in (M′ ×G)a (to ensure he is playing in the subgame A) and reach
any vertex of the form (mM′ , `(a))a in (M′ ×G)a.
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The case c 6= 0, a = 0 can be expressed in similar terms. Solving the game G′ amounts to solve,
for each reachable vertex of the form (c, a,mM, v,mM′), one reachability (or safety in the
case c = 0) game in the subgame (M×G)c initialized in (µM(mM, v), νM(mM, v))c and one
reachability (or safety in the case a = 0) game in the subgame (µM′(mM′ , v), νM′(mM′ , v))a
initialized in (mM′ , v). Thus, G′ is solvable in PTime.
We claim that Challenger wins G′ if, and only if σ 6 σ′.
⇒ Let S be a winning strategy of Challenger in G′. This means that for each strategy T
of Prover, the outcome ρ of (S, T ) satisfies the winning condition WC . Thus, we know
that every such ρ leaves (M× G ×M′) after a finite number of steps, that is, there
exists kρ ∈ N such that ρkρ is of the form (c, a,mM, v,mM
′). As Prover has only one
move to make in each outcome, which occurs after the choice of c and a by Challenger,
there actually are only two different possible outcomes for S: the outcome ρc, which
corresponds to Prover choosing to contest c, and the outcome ρa, which corresponds
to Prover choosing to contest a. The two outcomes ρc and ρa share a longest common
prefix h′ ∈ V ′∗ that satisfies that h′ = h˜(c, a,mM, v,mM′) where h˜ ∈ (M× G ×M′),
|h˜| = k = kρc = kρa , last(h˜) = (mM, v,mM
′) and Succ(mM, v,mM′) = ∅ (otherwise,
there is no transition to the vertex (c, a,mM, v,mM′) and no way to reach the subgames
C or A).
Furthermore, as S is winning, there exist two infinite paths h˜c in (M×G)c and h˜a in
(M′ × G)a such that ρc = h˜(c, a,mM, v,mM′)h˜c and ρa = h˜(c, a,mM, v,mM′)h˜a. Let
h be the history in G corresponding to h˜ in (M× G ×M′) and let hc and ha be the
infinite paths in G corresponding to h˜c and h˜a. Consider now the outcomes hhc and
hha in G. By construction, the outcome hhc is compatible with σ, and yields payoff c.
Thus, cVal(h, σ) ≥ c. By construction, the outcome hha is compatible with σ′ and yields
payoff a. Thus, aVal(h, σ′) ≤ a. Finally, we have that h is compatible with σ and σ′,
σ(h) 6= σ′(h) and cVal(h, σ) > aVal(h, σ′), that is, h is a non-dominance witness for σ
and σ′. Thus, σ 6 σ′.
⇐ Suppose σ 6 σ′. There exists a history h compatible with σ and σ′ such that σ(h) 6= σ′(h)
and cVal(h, σ) > aVal(h, σ′). Let c = cVal(h, σ) and a = aVal(h, σ′). There exists an
infinite path hc from last(h) such that the outcome hhc is compatible with σ and yields
payoff c. Hence, there exists a corresponding infinite path h˜c from last(h˜) in (M×G),
and thus a corresponding path in (M× G)c. Similarly, there exists an infinite path
ha from last(h) such that the outcome hha is compatible with σ′ and yields payoff a.
Hence, there exists a corresponding infinite path h˜a from last(h˜) in (M′ ×G) and thus a
corresponding path in (M′ ×G)a. Let σ′ be the strategy of Challenger in G′ that:
in the first phase, follows h˜ in (M×G×M′),
at last(h˜) = (mM, v,mM′), chooses the successor vertex to be (c, a,mM, v,mM′),
in (M×G)c, follows h˜c,
and in (M′ ×G)a, follows h˜a.
The strategy σ′ is winning for Challenger. Indeed, since the values c and a are accurate,
the existence of both h˜c and h˜a are guaranteed. Furthermore, if c 6= 0, a vertex of the
form (mM, `(c))c appears in h˜c, thus the outcome ρc of G′ is winning. If c = 0, either a
vertex of the form (mM, `(0))c appears in h˜c or h˜c avoids all leaves, thus the outcome ρc
of G′ is winning. Similarly, we can see that ρa is also winning, regardless of a being equal
to 0 or not. Thus the outcome of G′ with Challenger playing according to S is winning
regardless of the strategy of Prover, that is, his choice between contesting c or contesting
a.
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We now expose equivalences between the decision problems we are interested in, and
properties (P1), (P2), (P3) and (P4) that can be decided with the use of Lemma 39.
I Proposition 40. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game over a graph G. LetM be
a Mealy automaton realizing a finite memory strategy M , and let S and T be parameterized
automata realizing sequences (Sn)n∈N and (Tn)n∈N of finite memory strategies. Then:
1. Let N = |G||S|.
Then (Sn)n∈N is a chain if and only if (P1) Ti  Ti+1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
2. Let N≺ = |G||S|+ (|G||S|)!.
Then (Sn)n∈N is an increasing chain if and only if (P2) Ti ≺ Ti+1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N≺.
3. Let NT = |G||T |(|M|+ 1) + 1, and suppose that (Tn)n∈N is a chain.
Then M 6v (Tn)n∈N if and only if (P3) M 6 TNT .
4. Let NS = |G||S|(2|T |+ 1), and suppose that (Sn)n∈N and (Tn)n∈N are chains.
Then (Sn)n∈N 6v (Tn)n∈N if and only if (P4) SNS 6 (Tn)n∈N.
The proof of Proposition 40.1 and 40.2 is based on the following auxiliary Lemma, whose
demonstration relies on the study of the loops that appear in witnesses of non dominance.
I Lemma 41. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game, let M be a parametrized
automaton over the game graph of G, and let (Tn)n∈N be the sequence of finite-memory
strategies realized byM. Then for every pair of integers n1, n2 > |G||M| satisfying Tn1 6 Tn2 ,
there exists 0 < k ≤ |G||M| such that for every i ∈ N, Tn1+(i−1)k 6 Tn2+(i−1)k.
Proof. Let n1, n2 > |G||M|, and let us suppose that Tn1 6 Tn2 . By Lemma 24, we know
that there exists a non-dominance witness h of Tn1 by Tn2 , i.e., a history h compatible
with Tn1 and Tn2 such that Tn1(h) 6= Tn2(h) and cVal(h, Tn1) > aVal(h, Tn2). We expose
an integer k ≤ |G||M| such that for every i ∈ N, we are able to construct, based on h, a
non-dominance witness of Tn1+(i−1)k by Tn2+(i−1)k.
Let h˜1, respectively h˜2, be the valid path of G×M corresponding to the history h and
the initial counter values n1, respectively n2. By supposition, both n1 and n2 are strictly
greater than |G||M|. As a consequence, since Tn1 and Tn2 have an identical behaviour as
long as both have not emptied their counter, and they disagree on the history h, there
exists a common prefix h˜′ of h˜1 and h˜2 such that |h˜′|g = |G||M|+ 1 and |h˜′|r = 0. Since
|h˜′|g = |G||M|, there exists a state (v,m) ∈ G ×M that appears at least twice in h˜′ just
after using a green transition. This repetition yields a decomposition h˜ah˜bh˜c of h˜′ such that
last(h˜a) = last(h˜b) = (v,m), and 0 < |h˜b|g ≤ |G||M|. Let k denote |h˜b|g.
For every i ∈ N, let h(i) denote the history ha(hb)ihc and let h˜(i) denote the valid path
h˜a(h˜b)ih˜c. For any valid continuation h˜′′ of h˜′, the path h˜(i)h˜′′ is valid and |h˜(i)h˜′′|g =
|h˜′h˜′′|g+(i−1)k. As a consequence, by Lemma 38, for every history h′′, for every n ∈ N, h′h′′
is compatible with Tn if and only if h(i)h′′ is compatible with Tn+(i−1)k. More generally, for
any outcome ρ, the outcome h′ρ is compatible with Tn if and only if h(i)ρ is compatible with
Tn+(i−1)k, and since G is prefix-independent, the payoff of these outcomes are equal. As a con-
sequence, cVal(h(i)h′′, Tn+(i−1)k) = cVal(h, Tn) and aVal(h(i)h′′, Tn+(i−1)k) = aVal(h, Tn).
In particular, if we let h′′ be the history such that hahbhch′′ = h, we obtain
h(i)h′′ is compatible with Tn1+(i−1)k and Tn2+(i−1)k;
Tn1+(i−1)k(h(i)h′′) = Tn1(h) 6= Tn2(h) = Tn2+(i−1)k(h(i)h′′);
cVal(h(i)h′′, Tn1+(i−1)k) = cVal(h, Tn1) > aVal(h, Tn2) = aVal(h(i)h′′, Tn2+(i−1)k).
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Therefore h(i)h′′ is a witness of non-dominance of Tn1+(i−1)k by Tn2+(i−1)k, hence
Tn1+(i−1)k 6 Tn2+(i−1)k. J
Proof of Proposition 40.1 and 40.2. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game, and
let S be a parametrized automaton over the game graph of G. We denote by (Sn)n∈N
the sequence of finite-memory strategies realized by S. Let N = |G||S|. and N≺ =
|G||S|+ (|G||S|)!.
Let US denote the set composed of the integers n satisfying Sn 6 Sn+1. It is clear that
if US is not empty, then (Sn)n∈N is not a chain. Conversely, if US is empty, then (Sn)n∈N
is a chain, since for every pair of integers n1 < n2, we have Sn1  Sn1+1  . . .  Sn2 .
Let us suppose, towards building a contradiction, that the minimal element m of US is
strictly greater than N. Then, we obtain from Lemma 41 that there exists an integer k > 0
such that Sm−k 6 Sm−k+1 by setting i = 0. This contradicts the minimality of m. As a
consequence, m ≤ N. This proves that (Sn)n∈N is a chain if and only if Si  Si+1 for every
1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Let VS be the set of integers n satisfying Sn+1  Sn. As before, we obtain that (Sn)n∈N
is an increasing chain if and only if US ∪ VS is empty. To conclude, let us suppose, towards
building a contradiction, that the minimal element m of VS is strictly greater than N≺.
Let m′ denote m − (|G||S|)!. Then, since |G||S| < m′ < m, Sm′+1 6 Sm′ by minimality
of m, and we obtain from Lemma 41 that there exists an integer k ≤ |G||S| such that
for every i ∈ N, Sm′+(i−1)k+1 6 Sm′+(i−1)k. In particular, since k divides (|G||S|)! and
m = m′ + (|G||S|)!, we have Sm+1 6 Sm, which contradicts the fact that m is in VS . As
a consequence, m ≤ N≺. This proves that (Sn)n∈N is an increasing chain if and only if
Si ≺ Si+1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N≺. J
Proof of Proposition 40.3. ⇒ trivial.
⇐ Assume thatM 6 TNT . By Lemma 24, we know that there exists a non-dominance witness
hNT for M and TNT such that hNT is compatible with M and TNT , M(hNT ) 6= TNT (hNT )
and cVal(hNT ,M) > aVal(hNT , TNT ). We claim that from hNT we are able to construct
non-dominance witnesses for an infinite number of strategies in the chain (Tn)n∈N.
Let ρ be an outcome of G such that hNT ρ is compatible with TNT and yields the
antagonistic value aVal(hNT , TNT ). We consider the valid path h˜NT in G×T that follows
the behaviour of TNT over the history h, the valid path hˆNT inM×G× T that follows
the behaviour of M and TNT over the history h, and the valid path ρ˜ in G × T that
follows the behaviour of TNT over the outcome ρ. We have one of the following: either
(a) |h˜NT ρ˜|g = 0 or (b) |h˜NT ρ˜|r ≥ 1. We show now how to construct new non-dominance
witnesses:
(a) Assume that |h˜NT ρ˜|g < NT . Then we know that hNT is also a non-dominance
witness for M and Tn for all n ≥ N ′ with N ′ = |h˜NT ρ˜|g. Indeed, by Lemma 38,
the outcome hNT ρ is compatible with every strategy realized by T initialized with a
counter value at least equal to the number of green transitions in h˜NT ρ˜, that is, N ′.
Furthermore, for n ≥ N ′, we have that aVal(hNT , Tn) ≤ pi(hNT ρ) by definition of the
antagonistic value. Thus, aVal(hNT , Tn) ≤ aVal(hNT , TNT ), and as cVal(hNT ,M) >
aVal(hNT , TNT ) we also have cVal(hNT ,M) > aVal(hNT , Tn). Recall finally that since
TNT (hNT ) = Tn(hNT ) and M(hNT ) 6= Tn(hNT ), we have M(hNT ) 6= Tn(hNT ). Hence,
the history hNT is also a non-dominance witness for M and Tn. There are infinitely
many n such that n > N ′, thus we obtain that M 6v (Tn)n∈N.
(b) Assume now that |h˜NT ρ˜|g ≥ NT = |G||T |(|M|+ 1) + 1. Then at least one of the two
following properties is verified: either |h˜NT |g > |M||G||T | and we expose a loop in hˆNT ,
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or |ρ˜|g > |G||T | and we expose a loop in ρ˜. In both cases we construct non-dominance
witnesses by iterating the loop.
1. Assume that |h˜NT |g > |M||G||T |. This means that there exists a state (mM, v,mT )
that appears at least twice in hˆNT after following a green transition, hence before any
red transition appears in hˆNT . Thus there exists a decomposition hNT = h1hlooph2
of hNT such that |hˆloop|g ≥ 1 and last(hˆloop) = last(hˆ1) = (mM, v,mT ). (note
that possibly h2 = ε). Let k ∈ N and consider the history hk = h1(hloop)kh2.
Since hNT is compatible with M and last(hˆloop) = last(hˆ1) ∈ M × G × T , we
know that hk is compatible with the strategy M for any integer k. Moreover, all
continuation paths after hNT forM are also available after hk, and conversely, hence
cVal(hNT ,M) = cVal(hk,M). Furthermore, by Lemma 38 we have that hk is com-
patible with Tnk , where nk = NT + k|hˆloop|g. Thus, we have Tnk(hk) = TNT (hNT ),
and it follows that Tnk(hk) 6= M(hk). Finally, since hkρ is compatible with
Tnk , aVal(hk, Tnk) ≤ pi(hkρ) = pi(hNT ρ) = aVal(hNT , TNT ). As cVal(hk,M) =
cVal(hNT ,M) > aVal(hNT , TNT ), we also have cVal(hk,M) > aVal(hk, Tnk). That
is, by Lemma 24, hk is a non-dominance witness of M by Tnk . There are infinitely
many such Tnk , thus we can conclude that M 6v (Tn)n∈N.
2. Finally, assume that |ρ˜|g > |G||T |. This means that there exists a state (v,mT )
that appears at least twice in ρ after following a green transition, hence before
any red transition appears in ρ. This yields a decomposition ρ = ρ1ρloopρ2 of
ρ such that |ρ˜loop|g ≥ 1 and last(ρ˜loop) = last(ρ˜1) = (v,mT ). Let k ∈ N and
consider the outcome ρk = ρ1(ρloop)kρ2. by Lemma 38 we have that hNT ρk is
compatible with Tnk , where nk = NT + k|h˜loop|g. Thus, we have Tnk(hNT ) =
TNT (hNT ), and it follows that Tnk(hNT ) 6= M(hk). Moreover, since hNT ρk is
compatible with Tnk , aVal(hNT , Tnk) ≤ pi(hNT ρk) = pi(hNT ρ) = aVal(hNT , TNT ).
As cVal(hNT ,M) > aVal(hNT , TNT ), we also have cVal(hNT ,M) > aVal(hNT , Tnk).
That is, by Lemma 24, hNT is a non-dominance witness of M by Tnk . Once again,
there are infinitely many such Tnk , thus we can conclude that M 6v (Tn)n∈N.
J
Proof of Proposition 40.4. Let us suppose that (Sn)n∈N 6v (Tn)n∈N. For every n ∈ N, let
Mn := |G||T |(|Sn| + 1) + 1, where Sn denote the Mealy automaton derived from S that
realizes the strategy Sn. Then there exists n ∈ N satisfying Sn 6 (Tn)n∈N, hence, by
Proposition 40.3, Sn 6 TMn . Let k be the smallest integer satisfying Sk 6 TMk .
If k ≤ NS , we can conclude the proof immediatly. Indeed, since (Sn)n∈N is a chain by
supposition, Sk  SNS , and then Sk 6 (Tn)n∈N implies SNS 6 (Tn)n∈N. Now, let us suppose,
towards building a contradiction, that k > NS . Note that, by Proposition 40.3, we know
that Sk 6v (Tn)n∈N. Therefore, for all n ∈ N, we have Sk 6 Tn. In particular, Sk 6 T2Mk . By
Lemma 24, there exists a non-dominance witness h of Sk by T2Mk such that h is compatible
with Sk and T2Mk , Sk(h) 6= T2Mk(h) and cVal(h, Sk) > aVal(h, T2Mk). Let c = cVal(h, Sk)
and a = aVal(h, T2Mk). Consider now a continuation path ρ such that the outcome hρ is
compatible with Sk and pi(hρ) = c, and a continuation path ρ′ such that the outcome hρ′ is
compatible with T2Mk and pi(hρ′) = a.
We consider the valid path h˜ in G× T that follows the behaviour of Sk over the history
h, the valid path hˆ in S ×G× T that follows the behaviour of Sk and T2Mk over the history
h, and the valid path ρ˜ in G× S that follows the behaviour of Sk over the outcome ρ. We
distinguish the following two cases: either (a) |h˜ρ˜|g < NS or (b) |h˜ρ˜|g ≥ NS .
(a) Assume that |h˜ρ˜|g < NS . Let k′ := k − |h˜ρ˜|g. By Lemma 38, we know that the outcome
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hρ is compatible with Sk′ . Thus, cVal(h, Sk′) ≥ c, and since cVal(h, Sk′) > c we have
cVal(h, Sk′) > aVal(h, T2Mk). Furthermore, as hρ is compatible with Sk and Sk′ , we know
that Sk′(h) = Sk(h) 6= T2Mk(h). Hence, by Lemma 24, the history h is a non-dominance
witness for Sk′ and T2Mk . Since k′ < k, we have that Mk′ < Mk < 2Mk, thus Sk′ 6 TMk′ ,
which contradicts the fact that k is the smallest index such that Sk 6 TMk .
(b) Assume now that |h˜ρ˜|g = k. Since k > NS = |G||S|(2|T | + 1), at least one of the two
following properties is verified: either |h˜|g > 2|S||G||T | or |ρ˜|g > |G||S|.
1. Suppose that |h˜|g > 2|S||G||T |. Then there exists a state (mS , v,mT ) that appears
three times in hˆ after the S-component follows a green transition. Thus we can
decompose h as follows: h = h1hloop1 h
loop
2 h
2, such that if we consider the corresponding
decomposition hˆ1hˆloop1 hˆ
loop
2 hˆ
2 of hˆ, we have last(hˆ1) = last(hˆloop1 ) = last(hˆ
loop
2 ) =
(mT , v,mS). Furthermore, there exists at least one green edge in the S-component of
each path hˆloop1 and hˆ
loop
2 . Let k1 = |hˆloop1 |Sg and k2 = |hˆloop2 |Sg .
By Lemma 38, since hˆ is compatible with T2Mk , we have |hˆ|Tg ≤ 2Mk, hence either
|hˆloop1 |Tg ≤Mk or |hˆloop2 |Tg ≤Mk. Assume |hˆloop1 |Tg ≤Mk (respectively |hˆloop2 |Tg ≤Mk).
Consider the path h1hloop2 h2 (respectively h1h
loop
1 h2). It is a valid path since last(hˆ1) =
last(hˆloop1 ) = (mS , v,mT ) (respectively last(hˆ
loop
1 ) = last(hˆ
loop
2 ) = (mS , v,mT )). Since
|hˆloop1 |Tg ≤ Mk (respectively |hˆloop2 |Tg ≤ Mk), we have that |hˆ1hˆloop2 hˆ2|Tg ≥ |hˆ|Tg −Mk
(respectively |hˆ1hˆloop1 hˆ2|Tg ≥ |hˆ|Tg −Mk). Thus by Lemma 38, h1hloop2 h2 (respectively
h1h
loop
1 h2) is compatible with TMk . Furthermore, the outcome h1h
loop
2 h2ρ
′ (respec-
tively h1hloop1 h2ρ′) is compatible with TMk and yields payoff a. Hence, we have that
aVal(h1hloop2 h2, TMk) ≤ a (respectively aVal(h1hloop1 h2, TMk) ≤ a). Let k′ = k−k1 (re-
spectively k′ = k−k2). By Lemma 38, we know that h1hloop2 h2 (respectively h1hloop1 h2)
is compatible with Sk′ . Furthermore, the outcome h1hloop2 h2ρ (respectively h1h
loop
1 h2ρ)
is compatible with Sk′ and yields payoff c. Hence, we have that cVal(h1hloop2 h2, Sk′) ≥ c
(respectively cVal(h1hloop1 h2, Sk′) ≥ c). Finally, we know that Sk′(h1hloop2 h2) 6=
TMk(h1h
loop
2 h2) (respectively Sk′(h1h
loop
1 h2) 6= TMk(h1hloop1 h2)) since Sk′(h1hloop2 h2) =
Sk′(h) (respectively Sk′(h1hloop1 h2) = Sk′(h)) and TMk(h1h
loop
2 h2) = T2Mk(h) (respec-
tively TMk(h1h
loop
1 h2) = T2Mk(h)). By Lemma 24, the history h1h
loop
2 h2 (respectively
h1h
loop
1 h2) is a non-dominance witness for Sk′ and TMk . Since k′ < k, we have that
Mk′ < Mk, thus Sk′ 6 TMk′ , which is a contradiction with the fact that k is the
smallest index such that Sk 6 TMk .
2. Suppose that |ρ˜|g > |G||S|. Then there exists a state (v,mS) that appears twice in ρ˜
after following a green transition. Thus we can decompose ρ as follows: ρ = ρ1ρloopρ2,
such that if we consider the corresponding decomposition ρ˜1ρ˜loopρ˜2 of ρ˜, we have
last(ρ˜1) = last(ρ˜loop) = (v,mS) and |ρ˜loop|g > 0. Then hρ1ρ2 is a valid outcome
since last(ρ˜1) = last(ρ˜loop). Furthermore, pi(hρ1ρ2) = c. Let k′ = |h˜ρ˜1ρ˜2|g. As
|ρ˜loop|g > 0, we have k′ < k. By Lemma 38, we know that the outcome hρ1ρ2 is
compatible with Sk′ . Thus, cVal(h, Sk′) ≥ c. Finally, since h is a prefix of hρ1ρ2,
we know that Sk′(h) = Sk(h) hence Sk′(h) 6= T2Mk(h). Hence, by Lemma 24, the
history h is a non-dominance witness for Sk′ and T2Mk . Since k′ < k, we have that
Mk′ < Mk < 2Mk, thus Sk′ 6 TMk′ , which is a contradiction with the fact that k is
the smallest index such that Sk 6 TMk .
J
Since the property P1 can be decided in PTime by applying Lemma 39 with adequately
chosen Mealy automata as parameters, we obtain the following theorem.
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I Theorem 42. Given a generalised safety/reachability game and a parameterized automaton,
we can decide in PTime whether the automaton realizes a chain of strategies.
Similarly, the property P3 can be decided in PTime by applying Lemma 39 with M
and the Mealy automaton corresponding to the strategy TNT as parameters. Moreover, by
Proposition 40.3, the problem of deciding property P4 can be reduced in polynomial time to
the problem of deciding property P3. Therefore Proposition 40.4 implies our final decidability
result.
I Theorem 43. Given a generalised safety/reachability game and two parameterized automata
realizing uniform chains of strategies, we can decide in PTime whether the chain realized by
the first is dominated by the one from the second.
5 Conclusions and outlook
We have observed that admissibility is lacking as a rationality criterion for infinite sequential
games with quantitative payoffs. Our primary counterexample suggests that chains of
strategies could provide a suitable framework to circumvent this issue. Abstract order-
theoretic considerations revealed that in the most general case, this does not work. However,
if we restrict to countable collections of strategies, every chain is below a maximal chain. This
restriction is very natural in a TCS setting. A more in-depth exploration of the game-theoretic
merits of such a notion of rationality based on chains of strategies is left for the future.
We explored the abstract approach in the concrete setting of generalized safety/reachability
games. Here, parameterized automata can give a very concrete meaning to chains of
strategies. Several fundamental algorithmic questions are decidable in PTime. There are
more algorithmic questions to investigate. Moreover, the generalization of our results from
generalized safety/reachability games to games with ω-regular objectives seems achievable
- our proofs make only very limited use of the special features of the former. Both these
endeavours could benefit from a better understanding of parameterized automata in general.
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